Swarthmore College

Works
Political Science Faculty Works

Political Science

1979

Food, Politics, And Agricultural Development: Case Studies In The
Public Policy Of Rural Modernization
Raymond F. Hopkins
Swarthmore College, rhopkin1@swarthmore.edu

D. J. Puchala
R. B. Talbot

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-poli-sci
Part of the Political Science Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Raymond F. Hopkins, D. J. Puchala, and R. B. Talbot. (1979). "Food, Politics, And Agricultural Development:
Case Studies In The Public Policy Of Rural Modernization". Food, Politics, And Agricultural Development:
Case Studies In The Public Policy Of Rural Modernization.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-poli-sci/124

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Political Science Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

1
The Politics
of Agricultural Modernization
Donald J. Puchala
Raymond F. Hopkins

The history of every modern country includes an account of how
agricultural change occurred. The forces that stimulated rural
populations to adopt new farming techniques or to abandon the land for
urban societyiiave also stirred major political struggles. In each country
the struggle for advantage in the countryside presents unique factors;
but in each this struggle—over control of land or the income from its
product—has had important consequences for the values, stability, and
form of politics of the country. Today, the politics of agriculture in the
less-developed countries turn on issues of access to land and control of
credit, markets, or other economic relationships.
This volume brings together a group of essays that review salient
aspects of agricultural change in particular countries. Even though the
essays vary in tone, emphasis, and historical or geographical scope, all
address similar questions; What role has government generally, and
particular government politics specifically, played in the success or
failure of agricultural modernization? What political forces has the
agricultural sector unleashed, and under what circumstances? Overall,
how has the chosen path of agricultural modernization in each case
reflected colonial or national politics; and how, in turn, has this affected
national politics?
Our fundamental purpose here is to provide case studies of
agricultural modernization that emphasize the political aspects and
ingredients of development. In doing this we seek to complement the
literature of agricultural economics as applied to rural development.
Theoretical and technical writings on agricultural modernization are
voluminous; the better known recent works are sound, sophisticated,
enlightening, and basic to our understanding of development.*
Nonetheless, many of those who approach problems of rural
development from agronomic and economic perspectives pay scant
attention to politics and government and their roles in agriculture. Such
1
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underemphasis frequently renders analysis incomplete, since public
policies toward agriculture influence prices, investment, planting
decisions, marketing strategies, land tenure patterns, crop mixes,
imports and exports, and rural incomes in every country of the world.
Understanding the origins, contents, and impacts of such policies, then,
must be fundamental to understanding agricultural development. Even
more important, analyses of development that omit the influence of
political factors can become theoretical exercises offering little guidance
in practical problem solving. For example, development proposals that
call for utilizing market forces and matching supply to demand via
prices utilize impeccable economic logic. But such prescriptions border
on fantasy where government policies regulate commodity and food
prices to serve ends other than agricultural development, where they
encourage uneconomic factor mixes for political reasons, or where they
ration capital for industrialization and thereby inhibit rural investment.
Similarly, agronomic prescriptions that anticipate higher yields from
better seeds, more fertilizer, and adequately proportioned water are
obviously sound. Yet they become practicable only under conditions
where information inputs and capital are accessible to rural populations
who have been appropriately educated and motivated to innovate.
Whether such conditions exist is largely a function of government
policy and administrative capacity, and these, in turn, result from
political considerations that often have little to do with agriculture as
such.
The Meaning of Rural Modernization
Rural modernization is a complex phenomenon. Although its modes
have varied considerably throughout history, and presently vary from
region to region, certain general outcomes signal its occurrence. First,
agricultural production and productivity increase substantially as
modernization proceeds. Enhanced productivity tends to be especially
marked with regard to labor and land, and these increases are most
frequently the results of changing technology, the second general
feature of agricultural modernization. Even though the extent and
impacts of technological change differ from country to country,
sustained development eventually requires technological change in all
cases.
More broadly conceived, rural modernization is an aspect of the
structural transformation of economies, a step in the progression that
has led countries and peoples from traditional feudal agrarianism to
modern urban industrialism.^ During modernization, labor moves from
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agriculture to industry as heightened productivity and improved
marketing and distribution systems make it possible for those fetv
working in the countryside to feed the many working in the cities.
Concurrently, the farmers’ greater participation in the cash economy
combines with escalating demand for their products to produce a
heightened rural well-being, an increase in disposable income, and an
enhanced demand for both agricultural inputs and consumer goods.
Rural demand stimulates urban industry, and reinvested profits
promote further industrial growth, thus creating new urban employ
ment, new demands for food, and further incentives to agriculture. Of
course it is a simplification to believe that national economic
development and industrialization result solely or even primarily from
the rising interdependence of rural and urban demand. But this is not
the point. Rather, what is important here is that structural transforma
tion, as reflected in shifting linkages between sectors, is both a result and
an index of rural modernization.
Many features of rural modernization are readily observable in the
statistical series and quantitative records of countries. Table 1.1, for
example, highlights the rural modernization of several countries in
terms of production, productivity, input technology, and structural
transformation. Equally relevant and revealing would be figures
showing that, typically, during or after agricultural modernization
rural wage rates move in tandem with urban ones, rural unemployment
and underemployment diminish (partly through migration), rural
literacy and education levels rise notably, rural savings and capital
increase, and living standards markedly improve, at least for the
“successful” farmers. Also, while some of the rural populace are gaining
these advantages, others are losing out—squeezed off the bud or
impoverished as new technologies and government policies disadvan
tage them.
There are other aspects of rural modernization that are less
quantifiable, but certainly important. For one thing, “successful”
peasants typically become farmers during modernization—much more
an attitudinal or psychological transformation than a physical one.
With this comes a new attentiveness to markets and a new receptivity to
innovation, new expectations concerning economic and social mobility
within and between generations, new openness to information, a
penchant for organization, and, usually, a heightened and more effective
political participation. In addition, traditional fatalism in the
countryside tends to give way to awareness and confidence in science
applied to agriculture. Parochialism diminishes as modern transport

TABLE 1.1
AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
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and communications obviate rural isolation; Lifestyles in the country
side become more secular, urbane, and comfortable as material and
intellectual poverty recede.^ In many aspects the American farmer
approximates this ideal, as described by Hadwiger and Talbot in
Chapter 2.
What parts do politics and public policy play in the course of such
“typical” rural modernization? What roles do public policy and the pol
icy process play in initiating and nurturing the economic, social, and
attitudinal transformations involved in evolution from primitive to
modern agriculture? Conversely, when, how, and why does public pol
icy, either by commission or omission, hinder, divert, or stifle such
transformations? These are the central substantive concerns of our book
and the main themes of the collected essays that compose it. Readers will
discover, however, that few pat and simple answers emerge to questions
about government’s role in agricultural modernization, mainly because
experiences are so varied and complex. There is no ready formula for
agricultural development, no universally reliable policy guideline, no
widely prescribable doctrine of innovation and reform, no superior
ideology of development. Agriculture has been modernized with a low
degree of governmental intervention, as in the United States, and with a
high degree, as in Japan.^ It has also floundered under a low degree of
intervention, as in India during the First and Second Five Year Plans,
and under a high degree, as in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.* Similarly,
agriculture has been admirably developed under capitalist systems, as in
North America and Western Europe, and under socialist ones, as in the
People’s Republic of China and Cuba.® But modernization has also
lagged under both systems, as evidenced by Brazil and Poland.^ Land
redistribution has furthered development in countries like Taiwan; it
was relatively inconsequential in Chile, and it probably set back devel
opment in nineteenth century Ireland and in present-day Bolivia.®
Analyzing Rural Modernization Policies
Methodologically, this book is a set of exercises in the comparative
analysis of agricultural modernization policies. Those engaged in these
exercises begin by assuming that policy outcomes range along a
continuum from “success” to “failure,” although the criteria for such
judgments vary widely. Even the seeming “success” of American
agricultural modernization has been challenged recently for its excessive
resource depletion, capital-intensiveness, and environmental pollution,
as Hadwiger and Talbot note in Chapter 2. Young Kihl finds a success in
the declining food self-sufficiency of Korea (see Chapter 6), while a
similar decline in Iran seems a failure to Schulz (Chapter 7). Even the
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critique of tractor policy in Pakistan offered by Herring and Kennedy
(Chapter 8) indicates debate and ambiguity over the employment and
production effects of tractor subsidization, although the effects on
income distribution clearly enhance inequalities.
Aside from divergency in evaluating outcomes, we will see from our
analyses that outcomes are shaped at different times and places by a
combination of factors that we shall term “policy components.” In other
words, they are shaped by the contents of policies. Analyzing a particular
government’s policy consists in identifying and accounting for the
components of its attitude and actions toward its rural sector either
consciously or inadvertently. Evaluating that policy means assessing the
appropriateness of the various components (singly or in combination)
under prevailing geographic, social, economic, political, and cultural
conditions, and studying their effects on agricultural production, rural
life, and the political role of agricultural groups.
Policy components assume specific forms and are of great variety and
uncertain duration in the modernization process of different countries,
yet standard classification is possible. All development policies, for
example, are directed toward explicit and/or implicit goals; all prescribe
a degree of official intervention into agricultural markets; all embody
means or modes of execution; all concern the allocation of resources; all
establish or suppress institutions of various kinds. Each of these
classifications warrants some elaboration.
The Goals and Priorities of Agricultural Policy

Generally speaking, agricultural modernization is most readily
furthered by agricultural policy when modernization is the goal of such
policy. Ironically, this has not always been (nor is it presently) the case.
In some countries governmental attitudes toward the countryside and its
inhabitants reflect indifference to rural modernization; in other
countries policies toward agriculture reflect governmental preoccupa
tions with development in other sectors. For both the Soviet Union and
the People’s Republic of China priorities in agricultural policy have
revolved around ideological aims at creating “new socialist men”;
ideological socialization ranked as more important than productivity or
production, as Bernstein notes in Chapter 4. India’s agricultural policy
under the First Five Year Plan set goals of nation-building and
integrating above rural development. Iran subordinates development to
regime maintenance. Japan’s aspirations for Taiwanese agriculture
during the colonial period had a good deal more to do with imperial
integrity than with rural modernization (see Chapter 5). The point is
that governmental goals in agricultural policy vary: some pursuits aid
modernization, and others clearly hamper it.
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Acceptability of Market Structures and Processes

In some countries agricultural development has been encouraged by
official reliance on market forces as the means and motors of
development—that is, the logic of supply and demand, the efficiency of
giving production cues with prices, and the simplicity of adjustment
and transformation via open competition. In such cases public policies
have mandated government intervention in economic intercourse only
to protect property, legalize contracts, standardize weights and mea
sures, or occasionally control abuses and negative effects of the market
(see Bates, Chapter 9, on negative externalities). In great contrast,
agricultural development in some other countries has been conditioned
so widely by public intervention that the effect has been complete
suppression of market forces. Under such regimes, market structures are
replaced by administrative ones, and market dynamics are superseded by
plans, production directives, and rationing schemes. Obviously, the
great majority of development regimes fall somewhere between high
reliance on market forces, as in early America, and comprehensive
regulation, as in the Soviet Union.^ The Japanese development
experience, for example, has rather elegantly interwoven market forces
and administrative controls.*® The important analytical point is that the
degree and utility of reliance on free markets embodied in rural
development policies do not vary by accident among national cases, and
the analyst should therefore be attentive to the reasons for and
appropriateness of market versus nonmarket emphases under varying
conditions.
Means Adopted to Pursue Policy Goals

Again, the array of ways that governments have gone about pursuing
their ends in agriculture, including modernization, is extensive. Some
have emphasized fiscal manipulation, as in Brazilian attempts to force
heightened productivity by raising land taxes.** Financial means, too,
have been used in a variety of ways to channel public funds into forming
an infrastructure, subsidizing inputs, prices, and incomes, compensat
ing expropriated landowners, providing credit, furthering research and
extension services, and educating farm families. In countries such as
Cuba and China where agricultural modernization has been only an
aspect of broader programs of rural improvement, public funds have
also been directed into health, recreational, cultural, and educational
facilities intended ultimately to enhance the human resources invested
in agriculture.*^
The primary legislative means to furthering agricultural moderniza
tion in a great many countries has been the land reform law, in which
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there is great variety. A number of land reforms have been punitively
directed and draconically enforced against larger landholders, some
times under the banner of heightened efficiency, sometimes out of
intentions to eliminate aliens and absentees, and sometimes as unabashed
campaigns of class warfare in the countryside. In this latter regard, Stalin’s
drive against the kulaks is notorious.'* As noted earlier, there
are few general lessons to be drawn from experience with land
reform and its relation to agricultural modernization. As an agri
cultural policy, many governments, especially in Latin America,
still continue to look at adjusting land tenure, however, as the
final step toward rural improvement. The policy analyst’s task
is to determine what kinds of land reform best contribute to
rural modernization and what kinds are least productive.
Border controls and foreign relations are also means that serve rural
development ends. In some cases where conditions are propitious,
governments find that integrating their agricultural sector or parts of it
with the world economy supports internal development; in other
instances, isolating agriculture has been a preferred strategy. Where cash
crops for export are important sources of development capital, as with
many coffee, cocoa, sugar, and cotton producing countries, export taxes
and foreign policies aimed at stable markets and enhanced earnings are
bound to development programs that rely on exchange earnings for
financing, as in Ghana (see Bates, Chapter 9). On the other hand, where
unreasonable foreign competition, in grains or processed food, for
example, threatens bankruptcy even to efficient local farmers, tariff
protection and consequent insulation from the world economy beccJme
ingredients of planning for rural development. Interestingly, almost
every country that has experienced rural modernization passed through
a high tariff period during initial and middle phases of development.
Other ways in which foreign policy means serve rural modernization
ends typically include relying on external markets for agricultural
inputs, looking to more advanced countries, multinational firms, and
international organizations for information and technology, and
seeking development capital from abroad (as does Iran, see Chapter 6).
Remarkable strides toward rural modernization in Taiwan and South
Korea, and in Israel as well, can be attributed in considerable measure to
American public and private development assistance.'^ But then too a
measure of early American agricultural growth also followed from
overseas investment.'* Finally, while there is controversy about the
efficacy of foreign food aid as a stimulant to rural development, some
governments have managed to integrate aid into modernization
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programs in an imaginative way—in the form of “food-for-work” on
rural infrastructure projects, or as “crop insurance” to encourage
experiments with new technologies.*®
Development in the countryside does not usually occur spon
taneously. People generally do not change their modes of living and
livelihood, even when desperate, until they are convinced that change
will either bring rewards or avoid punishments. The task of executing
policies aimed at change therefore involves governments in the search
for appropriate administrative instruments. Styles of official promotion
and enforcement during rural modernization range from gentle urging
to brutal coercion, although, typically, incentives and enticements are
preferred over sanctions. The Chinese government continues to rely
rather heavily, though hardly exclusively, on symbols and propa
ganda-slogans, campaigns, wall posters, verbal exhortation, exem
plary behavior, and the like—and the Indian government has also used
such methods with some effect.*’
Many governments direct their market interventions at providing
incentives for innovation, for instance in cases where genetically supe
rior seeds are publicly subsidized and fertilizers are distributed
below cost to encourage their adoption. Some governments, such as the
Japanese, have effectively mobilized rural elites and farmers’ organiza
tions to lead modernization drives. Still others, like the Chinese
nationalist government, have linked their agricultural extension
services with their gendarmerie to monitor compliance with official
policies (see Chapter 5 on Taiwan), and elsewhere, in a few cases,
development goals have been enforced by imprisoning or executing
recalcitrant peasants.
Origins and Allocation of Resources for Development

No policy can help attain goals without resources, and experience in
many countries reveals that rural modernization requires substantial
investments of time, energy, intellect, and money. The origins of
resources for agricultural development, however, differ considerably
over time and space. In North America and in some European countries
and their colonies, investing in rural development was, by and large, a
private-sector undertaking. Opportunities were signalled by expecta
tions of high return; initiative followed from individual entrepreneurship; capital came from private institutions and was granted to the state
from a stock of uninhabited or expropriated property. Early public
investment in these cases ~was limited to supporting research and
sometimes funding the development of infrastructure (although in
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North America even infrastructure was privately financed and
engineered until well into the twentieth century). The official policy, if
it can be called that, was to promote the uninhibited operations of
private capital markets by interfering as minimally as possible.
Elsewhere, of course, the origins of resources for development were to
be found in the public sector—planning and administration became,
surrogates for entrepreneurship; ministries of development or rural
reform and marketing boards replaced private financial institutions and
commodity exchange; and fiscal receipts served the function of private
savings. Policy under these conditions embodies an orchestration of
fiscal means, revenue needs, and anticipated costs of development
strategies. In instances where public revenues turn out either inadequate
or unreliable, governments may choose to finance development through
domestic inflation, as Brazil did during the 1960s, or through foreign
borrowing, as Peru, Sudan, and other countries in Asia and Africa have
done in recent years.'* Ultimately, there is no “better” or “poorer” way
to finance rural modernization, since much depends on the location of
resources, the relative allurement of alternative investment opportuni
ties, the strength and integrity of bureaucratic institutions, and the level
of entrepreneurship in different countries at different times. Needless to
say, much also depends on the magnitude of the development task and
the rapidity with which it must be accomplished.
There are, however, “better” and “poorer” investment strategies for
rural modernization, or at least there are some lessons to be learned from
experience. There is, of course, the standard economic rule of thumb
that advises investment to compensate for scarce factors—by rendering
them more plentiful or more productive. Investing in mechanization,
for example, compensates for scarce labor, investing in fertilizer raises
the productivity of scarce land, investing in irrigation makes more
efficient use of scarce water, sinking new wells makes water more
abundant, and so on. Repeating this scarcity dictum would be a trivial
exercise were it not for the fact that it is so often, and disappointingly,
overlooked in many countries’ agricultural development programs,
especially in those, like Pakistan’s, where mechanization in agriculture
becomes a goal in itself, pursued without regard to land, labor, and
capital ratios (see Chapter 8). The connection between factor scarcities
and investment strategies therefore bears monitoring. If capitalintensive technology is subsidized at the same time that rural
unemployment is growing, for instance, one may immediately suspect
that advantaged groups, such as large landholders or urban elites, have
substantial influence over the policy.
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The sequence of investment targets is also important. Early
investments to improve the quality of human resources tend, for
example, to correlate rather closely with later accomplishments in
agricultural production and productivity. Government drives to
promote literacy in the countryside before promoting more elaborate
programs of technological change unquestionably contributed to
progress in rural modernization in the United States, Europe, Japan,
Taiwan, and China.‘9 The productive impact was particularly
noteworthy in China, where, since the revolution of 1949, rural
education has been combined with measures to improve the health and
nutrition of the rural population. Similarly, early investment in
transport and communications also appears to be directly linked to
making rapid strides toward modernization. Overcoming bottlenecks in
marketing and distribution by providing roads, railroads, and
waterways, and integrating farmers into information networks via
media and extension services, contribute significantly to the shift from
subsistence agriculture to the specialization in production and new
rural-urban divisions of labor which necessarily accompany moderniza
tion. Furthermore, early investments in agronomic research have tended
to speed rural modernization and to bring benefits which far outweigh
the cost of research establishments. European accomplishments are a
testament to this, the Dutch, Danish, and British especially. But this has
also been the case for Japan, Canada, and the United States, as
Hadwiger, Talbot, and Aall point out in Chapters 2 and 3. The point
that fundamental investments to improve the environment for
agriculture should come before specific drives to change technology,
though obvious, is frequently overlooked in practice, as several of this
volume’s essays demonstrate (e.g., the chapters by Schulz and Bates).
Institutions for Rural Modernization

As the countryside changes, farms and other producing units are
altered in structure and function, markets are established or superseded,
schools are founded, financial and credit facilities such as banks and
cooperatives emerge, research and extension services are introduced, and
farmers organize for economic and political action. A good deal has
already been said about created and transformed infrastructure during
rural modernization. What needs to be underlined is that promoting or
suppressing various rural institutions and political movements is
inevitably a component of official development policies. Moreover,
building institutions that are appropriate to conditions in the
countryside and complementary both to farmers’ needs and govern-
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mental objectives is a challenging problem for policymakers. Contrari
wise, encouraging inappropriate or ill-designed institutions, such as
many cooperatives in Africa in the 1960s proved to be, can be a formula
for failure.
Agricultural production units assume considerable variety, and,
although different kinds usually coexist in any country, governments
tend to emphasize particular ones as vehicles for development.
Compare, for example, American official encouragement of the “family
farm” with Danish emphasis on the cooperative, Soviet promotion of
the kolkholz or collective farm, Tanzanian ujamaa villages, and the
elaborately tiered Chinese system of teams, brigades, and communes.
Which institutions are deemed ideologically superior depends ulti
mately on one’s leanings; which ones are appropriate vehicles for
rapidly raising production and productivity depends on prevailing
socio-cultural milieus and peculiar problems of resources and
agronomy in given countries. Therefore, connections between kinds of
producing units and kinds of development outcomes under varying
contexts warrant monitoring. Much the same can be said for marketing
institutions and credit facilities. Which contribute best to rural
modernization? Traditional money lenders who charge usurious rates of
interest but lend to even the poorest applicant? Modern banks that
charge reasonable interest but lend to only some applicants? Or
government ministries that charge nominal interest but lend for
certain projects or to certain people only?
Farmers’ organizations and rural political associations deserve special
attention in the analysis of rural modernization. Experience in Japan
and Taiwan has shown that farmers’ associations can be exploited by
governments as vehicles of modernization and carriers of technological
change—in effect, as extensions of extension services. Conversely, as in
the United States, an elite “subsystem” can capture the benefits of
government largely for itself. With appropriately recruited and
rewarded leadership, organizations can serve as instruments of
surveillance and even agents to enforce compliance with official policies
whether they favor current rural elites (as in Pakistan) or seek to displace
them (as has occurred in Taiwan). More generally, farmers’ organiza
tions have been channels through which information about the impacts
of policies has flowed back to governments. As such they have proven
essential to monitoring the effects of policy and crucial to the
governmental capacity for timely adjustment. What is important for
policy analysis, and what some of the following essays discuss is the
extent to which governments have used or abused various farm
organizations during rural development. Another question that is
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examined is what has resulted from their various attitudes and actions
toward these organizations?
Finally, there are the institutions of technological innovations per
se—research and extension services. It is fair to say that in every
successful case of rural modernization that we are aware of government
has been instrumental in fusing science and technology with
agriculture. Even in the United States, where much of the technological
development was in the private sector, federal and state investment in
university research in agronomy and forestry was notable in the
nineteenth century, when the land grant college network was
established. The European tradition of public subsidization of
agricultural research is, of course, much older, especially in plant and
animal genetics in Russia, Prussia, and England. On the other hand,
underemphasis on technology and low funding for agricultural research
proved costly to both Indian and Chinese rural modernization during
the 1950s, and insufficient research and technological innovation
currently poses a major obstacle to rural development in Africa.
Extension services are equally important. If a government does not
have the capacity to reach farmers directly, broad-gauged policies of
rural development cannot be executed effectively or monitored
adequately. Creating, maintaining, and effectively using an agricultural
extension service appears to be an ingredient of every successful case of
rural modernization. The absence or ineffectiveness of such structures
contributed to the failure of the land reform efforts in Bolivia in the
1950s (where newly “landed” peasants could not be shown how to use
their resources) and to lagging production growth in some Indian states
where agricultural extension agents preferred not to go into the
countryside to meet farmers.
Encompassing all these institutional developments and a phe
nomenon inextricably linked to agricultural and rural modernization is
the expansion of government. All the kinds of changes in agriculture
that we have reviewed have reflected or spurred *he expansion of state
power in the countryside. There are two reasons for this. First, for
traditional agricultural patterns to be supplanted by new rural
institutions and practices—such as changed land-tenure systems or
ownership distribution, increased credit, and new planting and
marketing techniques—new (usually national) bases for authority and
the settlement of conflicts are required and facilitated. That is, rural
change can be the forerunner as well as the product of new government,
as has happened in China. Second, new practices require expanded
services—new typies of production inputs, regulation of diseases, rules to
insure that wider markets operate securely, and an expansion of physical
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infrastructure, education, and extension work. The concern of
comparative policy analysis is to determine which of these have worked
successfully within varying contexts.
Policy Analysis and Comparative Case Studies
If we could know which combinations of official goals, degrees of
intervention, political and administrative means, sources and uses of
resources, and institutional emphases would yield successful rural
modernization under various conditions, our capacity to prescribe
would be a good deal more advanced than it is at present. Unfortunately,
we have not yet accumulated the systematic knowledge required to guide
governments toward courses of action that are simultaneously
economically efficient, politically practicable, socioculturally appro
priate, and agriculturally productive. That we lack this knowledge is a
major justification for this volume and a recurrent theme of its chapters.
Implicitly or explicitly there are at least six issues on the policy
agendas of countries undergoing rural modernization—land owner
ship, degree of foreign control, scale biases of technology, rural versus
urban biases, food versus nonfood production, and the instrumental
versus the consummatory role of the rural populace in modernization.
Some or all of the policy components identified earlier affect the
practical resolution of each of these issues. Moreover, these issues are not
independent of each other. Their resolution leads to the particular
policy configuration of a given country. Of course, this “configuration”
may or may not be stable over time and may or may not be conducive to
growth in agricultural productivity. The case studies of six countries
that follow, along with the three region-oriented analyses (Chapters 3,
9, and 10), do not systematically review the manner in which each of
these issues was resolved nor the apparent effects of each. Each chapter’s
analysis does, however, examine some or most of these issues.^o
Land Ownership

Keith Griffin, among others, has argued that redistribution of land
ownership would be the most effective means of reducing rural
inequality and poverty and would increase production and total income
in most contexts.^' He notes that small farmers tend to use land more
completely and with higher yields and value added per hectare, as
evidenced by studies in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia,
Thailand, Pakistan, India, and the Philippines.^^ Yet land reforms have
frequently been inconsequential or outright failures, since much more
than simply redistribution is required, including considerable political
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“costs.” Two questions really come up with respect to land: What form
shall "ownership” take (i.e., shall individual communities or the
government be given title), and how equitable should distribution be?
Land ownership, as we see in the Iranian, Russian, and Chinese cases
(Chapters 4 and 7) can be used most importantly for political ends, either
to reinforce traditional rule or to revolutionize a society. When
development goals (e.g., production growth with or without equity) are
uppermost, economic rather than political calculations are presumably
determinative. In any event, policy elements such as goals, resources,
and institutions will all be affected by the way a regime settles the
question of land ownership.
External Control

As we noted in several cases, notably Pakistan, Iran, Korea, and
Taiwan, there has been a heavy reliance on external inputs and a
tolerance of foreign control in agricultural development. Interestingly,
both China and Taiwan have achieved considerable equity among their
rural populace while following or being subject to quite opposite
degrees of foreign control, especially since 1949. Furthermore, Cuba,
which sought to reduce foreign control after 1960, has met with some
difficulties as sugar production has declined and general dependence on
the Soviet Union has replaced that previously enjoyed by the United
States. The effects of foreign involvement and influence, therefore,
generally depend on the context; for example, they can be said to have
been favorable in Taiwan, mixed in Iran and Africa, and detrimental in
Pakistan and China.
Technology

Different technologies carry with them different “biases”; in
particular, most capital-intensive technologies, such as tractors, are not
scale-neutral but rather give advantage to the larger, wealthier farmers
(as the Pakrstan case makes clear; see Chapter 8). The most obvious
“non-transferable” element in the American experience, according to
Hadwiger and Talbot (Chaper 2), is our specific technology. Technol
ogy “choice” has a major effect on the policy options available
to developing countries. Different choices produced different options for
the earlier developers of Europe, according to Aall (Chapter 3). More
important than the technological inputs that capital investment can buy
may be the forms of the technology: Whkh-kiads offarms-andfarmers'
does it advantage? Is it scale-neutral or does it favor extensive or intensive cultivation? Even though the ejfects of the “green revolution” have
been more scale-neutral than many expected, continuing technological
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innovation of the same kind in less agronomically favorable areas may
well lead to wide-spread impoverishment and a more volatile political
.role for rural areas.If pohcY_^cisiom^esolve the issueof Jcind of
technology in favor of ^p^e j^ith a Jar^ farm bias~(usually through
subsidies and provision of services for farm commodities), then the
“choice” of equitable land distribution would work at cross-purposes to
the goal of increased production. Hence, the effect of technology may be
‘ as important for equity as for production if it favors large landowners for
certain regions to the absolute disadvantage of others.
Rural Versus Urban

A fourth issue for policy resolution is the question of whether to favor
rural or urban populaces.As we noted earlier, all development
involves intersectoral stimulalion—industry in towns and agriculture
in the~ countryside advance together, as Aall notes pointedly for
England. However, production in one sector may be supported by the
I other through direct_intersectoraE transfers^-as well, usually through
goyem^mejiLtaxes. Classically, the city has advanced at the expense of the
rural population, whether through cheap-food-p&licies, confiscatiomof
I export earnings, or other causes. This pattern, whether found in the
' UnTted'Sfates, the Soviet Union, or Ghana, is no longer likely to yield
the same growth effects. And in the wake of such intersectoral transfers,
the basis for rural tensions, given the diffusion of expectations, is now
much greater. Bates’s discussion of the discontent among Ghanaian
cocoa growers (Chapter 9) illustrates this point.
!

Food Versus Nonfood

A fifth issue is whether food self-sufficiency should be encouraged
through extra-market incentives. Iran and Korea, with their declining
food production compared to demand, have chosen to subsidize
consumer prices, though not totally at producers’ expense. The
gotrieniment has_instead paid a subsidy to maintain a differential
between higher farm and lower urban retail prices. Other related
policies ~3o harm farmers. For instance, when higher earning export
crops or cheaper food imports (e.g., food aid) create incentives to move
away from food production, this shift will also affect the urban-rural
terms of trade because cheaper foad.4Dric£S_ggn£raily favor the urban
population. Policies in Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere favoring-export
crops and/or imported extensive-type technologies for food production
are surprising in the wake of the global food shortages of 1973-74 and the
projections of substantial and growing food deficits in less developed
countries as a whole—expected to be 185 million tons by 1990, up from
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21 million tons in 1975.25 Nicholson and Esseks (Chapter 10) discuss a
number of the problems food shortages pose for policy makers in
developing countries.
Role of the Rural Populace

A final issue is the political role played by the rural populace in policy
making. Modernization through revolution has been advanced as
rural “classes” aided revolutionary efforts in China, Russia, Cuba,
and elsewhere (see Bernstein, Chapter 4).2s At the opposite ex
treme, the countryside may be viewed as politically impotent, serving
prinr^^lly ac a cnppUpr nf capital through “prof^” captured bv the
government to support urban industrialization. In the Soviet Union, the
Russians may have played both these roles from 1917 through 1937. The
I goals of policies, of course, are important in reflecting or establishing
I these alternative roles in modernization. At one extreme the well-being
of the rural populace may be regarded as an end in itself and, hence,
growth in their consumption becomes a critical yardstick for evaluating
policy. At the other extreme, rural people are seen as an instrument of
production whose immiscibility is irrelevant to policy evolution, except
as it may have a negative effect on production or political stability.
Although some consultants believe that they can knowledgeably and
confidently offer advice on these issues, we recommend caution. There is
at present a respected body of theoretical knowledge concerned with the
economics of development and an equally impressive body in the fields
of theoretical and applied agronomy and the cognate sciences. Drawing
on these helps achieve a better and more systematic understanding of
rural modernization but can hardly complete the intellectual task, since,
as noted earlier, they fail to take into account the economic, social, and
culmral factors that shape politics and affect policy miplementation. In
contrast to theoretical scientific analyses, there is also a wealth of
practical experience with agricultural modernization—scores of cases,
historical and contemporary, libraries of description, documentation,
anecdotal insights, and case-study materials that can be mined by
scholars in the search for a more complete and systematic understanding
of relationships between public policies and rural transformation. What
these case analyses can show is that under particular conditions certain
combinations of policy components produced particular results—some
good, some bad. Multiplying cases and reconfirming relationships
increases the generality of the findings, and, ultimately, such
comparative research and inductive logic can yield systematic knowl
edge. This book’s collection of case studies of rural modernization is a
preliminary and very small step in the direction of such knowledge. We
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certainly do not recommend that Third World governments delay efforts
at agricultural development while scholars accumulate more complete
knowledge about the process. There is no time for this. We do suggest
that governmental efforts will become more successful as our
understanding becomes more complete and contextually relevant.
There is an urgency, then, in the task that we have proposed to our
colleagues and begun work on in the chapters of this volume.
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